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Abstract 
 extreme character, which makes it different from other historical events, can arguably by associated with the 
a  This radicality emanates from those elements of the cataclysm that seem to 
hardly surprising that the Shoah poses some of the biggest challenges to our capacities to comprehend, conceive, and 
represent, not only historical events, but history and historicity. It turned out to be -
e historical circumstances in which it is written, we 
s a re-examination of philosophical categories. This does not mean we will find 
no meaning of the Holocaust: but if we want to deepen our understanding of it, we have to treat it as a philosophically-
historical and cultural problem, subject to philosophically-historical and cultural answers1.  
 
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Claudiu Mesaros (West University of 
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1. Introduction 
There is arguably no greater challenge to our capacities to comprehend and conceive philosophically history 
and historicity than the Holocaust. This extreme case of modern mass-murder seems to transcend the limits of 
 
1 A shorter version of my discussion of philosophical-historical concepts associated with the memory of the Holocaust was included in my 
paper entitled Paradoxes of symbolic encryptions of memory in Holocaust memorialization presented on the 9th of November 2012 at the 
ESSACHESS-ORC IARSIC International Conference on Communication of the symbolic and the symbolic of communication in the modern 
and postmodern societies, ITIC, Paul Valéry University of Montpellier 3, Beziers, France. The paper will 
proceedings volume. 
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these very capacities. Some authors from Lacoue-Labarthe to Lyotard, and other numerous members of the 
academic Holocaust industry criticized by critics like D. LaCapra, S.  D. Stone consider that the only 
appropriate attitude to this profound tragedy is respectful silence [1], whereas others exile it to the space of 
absolute exception, historical aberration or accident  and thus to a zone of historical irrelevance  of the atypical 
and unconceivable/unspeakable  again  (The most prominent names include Elie Wiesel, Deborah 
Lipstadt, Lucy Dawidowicz, Eberhard Jäckel, Yehuda Bauer, and Steven Katz.)  
Final Soluti  into an event at the limits is the very fact that it is the most radical 
form of ]. And yet, perhaps surprisingly, the Holocaust will not transport us 
to a system of philosophically-historical assumptions substantially different from those underlying our postwar 
civilization. Along similar lines, Alan Rosenberg and Paul Marcus argue that many people observed that the 
changes in th ]. This historical catastrophe, which 
poses a radical counter- ] requires a new philosophical approach, instead 
of mer unless we entertain the dubious proposition that philosophy has 
nothing to do with the historical circumstances in which it is written, we must ask how the events in Germany 
force a re-examinat   
2. The Holocaust as challenge to traditional philosophical understanding  
Some authors, most notably Berel Lang, saw the roots of such a catastrophe in the most basic principles of 
Enlightenment [6]. 
essential role both in conceiving the individual self in terms of a formally general definition  thus excluding 
concrete historical differences  and in the grounding of the definition of that universal self in formal criteria 
which cannot be applied formally. According to Berel Lang [7], the definition works as a formal principle when 
applied in order to distinguish a group or individual from another, acting purely stipulatively, consequently 
arbitrarily.  
 
The notion of a universalist definition of the self contains the basis of this inconsistency within itself, since it implies that the concept of 
humanity is not exclusionary, but at the same time makes clear that the concept is inapplicable without a criterion of exclusion (without such 
a criterion there would be nothing that was not a self) ].  
 
The danger here is that an individual or a group of individuals could thus be excluded on the basis of this 
principle so that even their minority status would be denied.  
Being confronted with a powerful Christian tradition, the Enlightenment ideologues and jurists were 
developing, in specific fo
the possibility of freedom and equality that was now open to them, all citizens of the new regime had the 
obligation to commit themselves to those ideas by renouncing the differences that had characterized their 
previous tutelage. The derived principle of tolerance appeared thus quite tightly conditioned. Although the terms 
of the new principles allowed considering groups previously not acknowledged, the continuous criticism of 
difference itself and the ideological structure underlying it were prevalent in terms of their compelling force. 
What starts out as a commitment to tolerance turns out to be not acceptance of diversity in its own terms, but a 
tolerance of difference within the margins fixed by a ]. Anyone, or any group 
outside these margins, no matter how close or far, was to be excluded. If I am to refer to the quintessential 
expression  in legislative form  of these principles, namely the (original) Declaration of the Rights of Man (27 
August 1789), it did not include Protestants or Jews under its purview, but suspended their legal status until the 
 
 
The principles themselves pertain to the rights and obligations of those who came fully within the domain of citizenship (and, to that 
extent, of humanity). To place anyone outside that domain is to open the way to arbitrariness, not only in the first judgment of who has or has 
not the right to a civic identity, but also the subsequent judgment of how those who do not have ].  
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However, it is highly problematic to conclude that at the root of the extreme acts and attitudes of modern 
history that is, behind all  to eliminate the difference there are 
only ideas inspired by the Enlightenment. The impact of some dominant nineteenth philosophical trends and 
sciences  such as biology and linguistics  is undoubtedly deeper than that of any ideas pertaining to the 
previous centuries. Romanticism  
uniformism  promoted the respect for individuality (including minorities, and martyrs per se), for the creative 
impulse and the freedom to live and act according to un-imposed personal principles, but also for unrestricted 
beliefs and emotions (exemplarily personified by the rebel artist) underlying private life, individual 
consciousness and rights. But the dark side of the same system of beliefs promoted the sinister genius-artist 
the ultra-revolutionary who destroys old societies in order to 
lay down new foundations, and was behind so many hysterical derailments into violent irrationalism and 
fascism  ]. It brings into light romantic principles such as race (and the derived racial hygiene), das Völk 
(regarded in a purist way and in organic association with the purism of language), Völkischekultur or 
Kulturnation, and their entailments [9]. Paradoxically, such outbursts of anti-rationalism and their links with 
 their emotional drives often intersect and reinforce the sinister 
logicality of exclusion.  
3. Philosophical paradoxes of counter-rationality 
Yet, when it comes to the Holocaust, this combination of schemas remains wanting. Its teleological 
underpinning turns it into a pr  intentions and actions that 
 [10] 
insightful view, cultural critics and historians, although no longer naïve positivists, often rely on philosophical 
assumptions which contradict their findings about the nature of culture, modernity or civilization. In the case of 
t paradox whereby the set of events that challenge basic assumptions about the 
modern state are approached with those same assumptions ]. This paradox is still little acknowledged among 
placing of neat, conceptually familiar accounts of the  events under the over-arching teleologies of continuous 
Progress and ascendant History have implicitly over- . 
monuments, required courses, very careful documentation, systematization, 
conferences, novels, films, etc.  and nothing changes in the still desperate hope that History is still moving 
].  
-situation and a challenge to the very meaning 
of our civilization. Hannah Arendt calls the Holocaust an organized attempt to eradicate the concept of the 
], while Dan Diner describes it as the event that shattered the elementary bases of civilization 
]. Unfortu treated 
the Holocaust as a historical aberration, [tr  roughly equivalent to what 
might be expected if insane inmates were able to take over the operation of a mental institution ] and thus 
consigned it to the [pure] irrational [...] [But if this is so, then] there is nothing left to be said  no interpretation 
is possible, no lessons to be learned from it. And thus it would be, at best, a mystery or, at worst, a meaningless 
]. 
In the case of the Holocaust, the difficulty of re-constituting and representing past mental processes is 
suggested by the obstacles indicated by Dan Diner with respect to historical understanding:  
 
The notion of understanding as a process in which conclusions are drawn about an internal motive from external manifestations is based 
on the assumption [ ] that both historical reconstruction and the action of the historical subject are guided in a similar f
[16].  
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In fact, what we see in the case of the Holocaus counter-
not irrationality embedded in the overriding logic of mass- ]. 
Confronted with, and experiencing existentially, the Nazi counter-rationality which was not primarily an 
economic or a strictly utilitarian logic, but a self- -contamina  and annihilative 
teleology  and  Judenräte tragically replicated its fractured character in their own 
disoriented responses. By finding it impossible to follow and anticipate, in terms of a strictly utilitarian 
sure the postponement of deportation 
those people, Jews and others, put in the limit-
applicable in their case, as they were deprived of any possibility of choice, their existence being, as Lawrence 
Langer [17] suggestively put it choiceless choice:   
 
When such an existence transforms the life instinct and forces men and women who remain alive to suspend the golden rule and embrace 
do unto o  we must expect some moral rust to flake from the individual soul. We are left with a 
spectacle of reality that few would choose to celebrate, if they could tolerate a world where words like dignity and choice had temporarily lost 
their traditional meaning because Nazi brutality had eliminated the human supports that usually sustained them [...] [S]uch a world [...] 
threatens our sense of spiritual continuity [17].  
 
Such manifestations, or consequences of counter-rationality, writes Diner, should determine the historians to 
adopt, in their effort to describe Nazism and der Endlösung a negativist historical cognition and a cancellation 
of basi ]. 
unparalleled scope and devastating eff  if judged according to 
riteria of reasonable thinking  as Lucy Dawidowicz describes it [18], such a phenomenon demands a 
new approach, under the pressure of what Karl Jaspers stressed in Anyone who 
plans the organized slaughter of a people and participates in it, does something that [appears to be] fundamentally 
different from all crime  the Holocaust requires us to rethink our 
].  
The present age manifests an obsessive preoccupation with memory (in its collective or social sense). The 
modern distinction between past and present and its representation of temporality as an infinite continuum 
(within which any event vanishes immediatel two competing experiences of time: 
 These irreconcilable tendencies generated various responses, among which various forms 
-oriented thinking  a way of understanding the past that suggests 
that n  remain untouched, such ].  The 
feeling of loss triggers nostalgia, and collective memory comes into existence as a counterbalance of loss and an 
element of stability. Modern genocide came to symbolize extreme instability. The Holocaust although not an 
appropriate etalon of reflection on genocide in general was not a total break with what happened before, but a 
radical version of genocidal experiences that have taken place throughout modern history [21].  
In our age of memory, commemorating one of the greatest catastrophes occupies the central place within the 
the Holocaust typifies this process of memory work. History, par excellence, is the representation of the past 
within its absence. The nature of representation determines what meaning we give to the past.  
It is not being absent but absence itself that facilitates the possibility of the imaginatio  In the case of 
Auschwitz, the issue of representation implies to recognize that the way [its] stories are told is itself constitutive of our understanding of the 
past. This ineluctable mediation ].  
The human function which mediates between past and future  memory, as Hannah Arendt illustrates [22]  
resides between the "  She wr
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 (make present) the past and deprive the past of its definitely bygone character. 
memory transforms the  [24].  
As already stated, the Holocaust arguably represents the main challenge to historism, which has as its goal the 
historicization of the past  that is, its reification. The modern projection of time as a linear succession that 
nature of the Holocaust. As Lawrence Langer [17] suggestively noted, in the case of the Holocaust memory 
successful incorporation and will only uphold the uneasiness mixed with fascination that still dominates the 
responses to the Holocaust;  
confronts the horror only to prolong and even add to our obsession with it;
normalize the horrific;  a culture (a permits mass murder as an option for self-
]. 
comes to Holocaust, commemorating the greatest challenge to meaningful memory may not be ignorance or 
hostili , the flattening, desensitizing effect of seeing or saying or thinking 
the same thing too many times until we have numbed our audience and rendered them immune to the evil we are 
 [25]. 
The attempt to incorporate the Holocaust into the established, conventional systems of thought that defines the 
historist approach requires transforming memory into history according to the strategy of forgetting and 
remembering which Nietzsche famously described. [26,27 [10] inspired formulation, the failure of 
the paradox of wanting to make the Holocaust into history alongside the desire to 
 This unsuccessful domesticating attempt turns into an ongoing cycle of repression 
and its return. Throughout this,  
 
the attempt to historicize and memorialize ends in the periodic resurfacing of traumatic memory in the present, followed by further 
attempts to historicize [ ] Rather than being a comforting compensation for the disenchantment of history, Holocaust memory invades the 
present in a way that dangerously disrupts notions of linear time, and certainly does not bring comfort ]. 
4. Un-narratability, negative radicality and the construction of meaning  
Shoah sociated by Dan Diner 
 This radicality emanates from those elements (i.e. historical facts) of the 
that seem to lack any apparent meaning when measured by previous historical ex  [16]. Their 
impact on historical representation ma gauged in terms of 
Auschwitz has no appropriate narra  
phenomena which render the Holocaust its negative radicality at the level of it the 
extreme relationship between time and number  The slaughter of millions took place in an extremely short 
Beyond its mere empirical meaning, this figure symbolizes the appropriate narrative, which the 
 unnarratability, the vacuum fills with surrogate tales possessing an epic 
 [16]. For Jewish memory,  
the absence of appropriate narrative leads to the mode of consciousness that can be termed compressed time [ ] In place of a historical 
representation of the Holocaust comes a narrative that concentrates mostly on its real or supposed prehistory [ ] Analogous to a negative 
teleology, it is able to shift the enormous, un-narratable weight of the Holocaust back to a temporal continuum emerging from a distant past, 
[and thus] imbues the event, however interpreted, with meaning [16]. 
In an analysis of two important works of postmodernist fiction that deal explicitly with the politics of memory, 
made in Of Grammatology of 
is no outside-the- ) and the difficulty/impossibility of accessing a reality outside of representation and 
signification  [28] has deep implica particularly in the case of traumatic events 
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 His poststructuralist-deconstruct impossibility of 
finding truth, not merely in its transcendental philosophical sense, but also in the possibility of a material and 
histo  In his turn, Jean-François Lyotard basically holds that  
postmodernism (and modernism itself) takes place in the realization that Enlightenment, rationalism, and scientific positivism are not tied to 
objective truth and reality, but rath
  [29].  
But if the postmodern perspective is useful in dismissing the existence of immutable or transcendental grounds 
for the historical truth
appeal we should not perceive postmodernism as total relativism. The Holocaust can be arguably considered 
the harbinger of post-modernity, which represents a horizon that attempts to work at the limit of Enlightenment 
thought, questioning hegemonic concepts. As Stone correctly observes, its claim about the inexistence of 
 
a statement about meaning in history, not about [factual] accuracy [ ] [O]ne thing that postmodernism has done is make us aware that all 
history is necessarily constructed [ ] and that the past does not exist outside of its representations ].  
5. Functionalism vs. fantasy-thinking 
This does not mean we will find no meaning of the Holocaust: but if we want to deepen our understanding of 
it, we have to treat is as a a philosophical-
allow their values to interact with longer-established German narratives 
in a way that rendered exclusion and then rendered genocide meaningful and possible [21].    
Analyzing the interpretative disputes in historiography  mainly those between  and 
,  and those between the  and  theorists is key [21]. Stone is most 
convincing in his dissociation from the views of the relationship between modernity and the Holocaust put 
forward most notably by Raul Hilberg, Detlev Peukert, Götz Aly Susan Heim, or Zygmunt Bauman. For 
instance, the latter, in his much-discussed book Modernity and the Holocaust [30], borrowing a rather 
schematized version of Weberian terminology, argues that the Holocaust was the product of a bureaucratic and 
rationalized world; an attempt to replace spontaneity that was carried out without hatred, and which represented 
the finest example of the modern tendency to devise blueprints for the world, designed to purify the world by 
removing unaesthetic or un-assimilable elements. This argument is valued by Stone because of its philosophical 
-thinking, eugenics, and 
medicine in Germany and elsewhere, to conclude that the Nazi Germany did not represent an aberration in an 
world that created Auschwitz is basically still with us; indeed, the possibility of even greater genocides is still 
real because our world is even more rationalized and technologically administered. 
-purposive aspects of hatred and 
genocide. His theory suggests that increasing domination over nature (advocated by the Enlightenment) has led 
inexorably to the domination  of the modern bureaucratic state and 
that the murder of the Jews could have been the extreme outcome of bureaucratic culture [21]. But the 
compelling evidence Stone finds leads him to the conclusion that anti-Semitism and genocide are never 
implemented coolly, without passion. Rather, irrespective of the use of -  something 
that accounts for only half of  Stone argues that anti-Semitism in the twentieth 
century has been a product of modernity for a different reason, and that the genocide of the Jews is an indictment 
on modern society, but not for the reasons indicated by Bauman. Stone does not dispute the existence of 
biopower (like in Foucault or Giorgio Agamben), or the history of race-thinking and eugenics. At the same time, 
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he argues that the genocidal fantasy lay at the core of Nazism since its very beginning. It was fuelled by a 
metaphysical-anthropological and mythological-political grounding of the Nazis ) 
attitude towards the Jews, which rendered the Holocaust its distinctive character as the genocide of the Jews: 
[Event though the Nazi] policy-making and individual decision may have been made on an ad hoc basis, they were made within a framework 
of vicious, paranoid Jew-hatred [...] 
bureaucratically and relied in part on technological killing methods [...] [Yet] the deep essence of the Holocaust was an outburst of 
transgressive violence that owed more to fantasy- dialectic of Enl  But [...] 
thinking about the Holocaust in these terms does not exculpate modern society altogether; rather, the rationalized structures of modernity not 
only chanelled but created the fantasies of Nazism  [21].    
Among the worring outcomes of the Shoah
our optimism and confort entailed by deepening the knowledge of human condition, the reflection on the 
 
 those so familiar to us today censuses and the categorization of people, technology, 
me  -thinking which  
under the right circumstances can be put to terrible use: fear of immigrants and disease, hygiene fetishism, body-
 [21]. 
6. Conclusion. Towards a  philosophy of irresolution 
Ultimately, the solution to such a crucial problem so necessary to the self-understanding of modern 
civilization requires the understanding of what lies embedded in our past and its relation to the present. It is a 
rather than accounts of conti -
- final 
 As Young so suggestively wrote, the surest engagement with memory lies in its 
perpetual irresolution  [31].  
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